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Abstract
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is one of the most promis-
ing security solutions to emerging Machine Learning as a
Service (MLaaS). Several Leveled-HE (LHE)-enabled Con-
volutional Neural Networks (LHECNNs) are proposed to
implement MLaaS to avoid the large bootstrapping over-
head. However, prior LHECNNs have to pay significant
computational overhead but achieve only low inference ac-
curacy, due to their polynomial approximation activations
and poolings. Stacking many polynomial approximation ac-
tivation layers in a network greatly reduces the inference
accuracy, since the polynomial approximation activation er-
rors lead to a low distortion of the output distribution of the
next batch normalization layer. So the polynomial approxi-
mation activations and poolings have become the obstacle
to a fast and accurate LHECNN model.
In this paper, we propose a Shift-accumulation-based
LHE-enabled deep neural network (SHE) for fast and
accurate inferences on encrypted data. We use the
binary-operation-friendly leveled-TFHE (LTFHE) encryp-
tion scheme to implement ReLU activations and max pool-
ings. We also adopt the logarithmic quantization to acceler-
ate inferences by replacing expensive LTFHE multiplications
with cheap LTFHE shifts. We propose a mixed bitwidth accu-
mulator to expedite accumulations. Since the LTFHEReLU
activations, max poolings, shifts and accumulations have
small multiplicative depth, SHE can implement much deeper
network architectures with more convolutional and activa-
tion layers. Our experimental results show SHE achieves
the state-of-the-art inference accuracy and reduces the infer-
ence latency by 76.21% ∼ 94.23% over prior LHECNNs on
MNIST and CIFAR-10.
1. Introduction
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) is an effective
method for clients to run their computationally expensive
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) inferences [1] on
powerful cloud servers. CNN inferences have to access to
client raw data, which potentially introduces security and
privacy risks. So there is a strong and urgent need to en-
sure the confidentiality of healthcare records, financial data
and other sensitive information of clients uploaded to cloud
servers. Recent works [2, 3, 4, 1, 5] employ leveled Ho-
momorphic Encryption (LHE) to perform CNN inferences
over encrypted data. During the LHE-enabled MLaaS, a
client encrypts the sensitive data and sends it to a server.
Since only the client has the private key, the server cannot
decrypt the input nor the output. The server produces an
encrypted inference output and returns it to the client. The
client privacy is preserved in this pipeline for both inputs
and outputs.
However, prior LHE-enabled CNNs (LHECNNs) [2, 3,
4, 1, 5] suffer from low inference accuracy and long infer-
ence latency. TAPAS [5] and DiNN [1] adopt only 1-bit
CNN weights, inputs and sign activations, so they degrade
3%∼6.2% inference accuracy even on tiny hand-written digit
dataset MNIST [6]. Since HE supports only polynomial
computations, CryptoNet (CNT) [2], NED [3] and Faster
Cryptonet (FCN) [4] have to use the square activations in-
stead of ReLU , and thus fail to obtain the state-of-the-art
inference accuracy. For instance, FCN achieves only 76.72%
inference accuracy on CIFAR-10 dataset [7], while the accu-
racy of an unencrypted CNN model with ReLU activations
is 93.72%. Although it is possible to improve the encrypted
inference accuracy by enlarging the degree of the polynomial
approximation activations (PAAs), the PAA computational
overhead increases exponentially with its degree. With even
a degree-2 square activation, prior LHECNNs, e.g., CNT
and NED, still require hundreds of seconds to perform an
inference on an encrypted MNIST image.
Moreover, the PAA is not compatible with a deep net-
work consisting of many convolutional and activation layers.
Stacking many convolutional and PAA layers in a network
actually decreases the inference accuracy [8], since the PAA
approximation errors lead to a low distortion of the output
distribution of the next batch normalization layer. As a result,
no prior LHECNN fully supports deep networks computing
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(a) Perf. and acc. of prior LHECNNs.
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(b) FCN PAAPs + various degrees (Ds).
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(d) The output of the 9th BN layer.
Figure 1. The performance and accuracy bottlenecks of prior LHECNNs testing MNIST: the PAAP (Conv: convolutional layer; FC:
fully-connected layer; Pooling: pooling layer; and Activation: batch normalization (BN) + activation layer).
the large ImageNet [9]. For instance, FCN [4] can compute
only a part (i.e., 3 convolutional layers with square activa-
tions) of a CNN testing ImageNet on the server but leave the
other parts of the CNN to the client.
2. Background and Motivation
Threat model. In the MLaaS paradigm, an inherent risk
of data transmission exists when clients send sensitive input
data or servers return sensitive output results back to clients.
Although a strongly encryption scheme can be used to en-
crypt data sent to the cloud, untrusted servers [2, 3, 4] can
make data leakage happen. HE is one of the most promising
encryption techniques to enable a server to perform CNN
inference over encrypted data. A client sends encrypted data
to a server performing encrypted inference without decrypt-
ing the data or the client private key. Only the client can
decrypt the inference result using the private key.
Homomorphic Encryption. An encryption scheme de-
fines an encryption function () encoding data to cipher-
texts (encrypted data), and a decryption function δ() map-
ping ciphertexts back to plaintexts (original data). In a
public-key encryption, the ciphertexts x can be computed
as (x, kpub), where kpub is the public key. The decryp-
tion can be done through δ((x, kpub), ksec) = x, where
ksec is the secret key. An encryption scheme is homomor-
phic in an operation  if there is another operation ⊕ such
that (x, kpub) ⊕ (y, kpub) = (x  y, kpub). To prevent
threats on untrusted servers, fully HE [10] enables an un-
limited number of computations over ciphertexts. However,
each computation introduces noise into the ciphertexts. Af-
ter a certain number of computations, the noise grows too
large so that the ciphertexts cannot be decrypted success-
fully. A bootstrapping [11] is required to keep the noise in
check without decrypting. Unfortunately, the bootstrapping
is extremely slow, due to its high computational complexity.
Leveled HE (LHE) [12] is proposed to accelerate encrypted
computations without bootstrapping. But LHE allows to
compute polynomial functions of only a maximal degree on
the ciphertexts. Before applying LHE, the complexity of
the target arithmetic circuit processing the ciphertexts must
be known in advance. Compared to Multiple Party Compu-
tation (MPC) [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18], LHE has much less
communication overhead. When applying MPC in MLaaS,
DeepSecure [15] has to exchange 722GB data between the
client and the server for only a 5-layer CNN inference on a
tiny MNIST image.
TFHE. TFHE [19, 16] is a HE cryptosystem that ex-
presses ciphertexts over the torus modulo 1. It supports
both fully and leveled HE schemes. Like the other HE
cryptosystems including BFV/BGV [20], FV-RNS [21] and
HEAAN [22], TFHE is also based on the Ring-LWE, but
it can perform very fast binary operations over encrypted
binary bits. Therefore, unlike the other HE cryptosystems
approximating the activation by expensive polynomial opera-
tions, TFHE can naturally implement ReLU activations and
max poolings by Boolean operations. In this paper, we use
TFHE for our design without its batching technology [19].
Although the ciphertext batching may greatly improve the
LHECNN model inference throughput by packing multiple
(e.g. 8K) datasets into a homomorphic operation, it has to se-
lect more numerous and restricted NTT points, force specific
computations away from NTT, and add large computational
cost [4]. Moreover, it is difficult for one client to batch 8K
requests together sharing the same secret key. In fact, a client
often needs to conduct inferences on only few images [23].
Motivation. As Figure 1 describes, prior LHECNNs
suffer from low inference accuracy and long inference la-
tency, because of the polynomial approximation activations
(PAAs) and poolings. CryptoNet (CNT) [2] and Faster Cryp-
toNet (FCN) [4] add a batch normalization layer before each
activation layer. They also use square (polynomials with
degree-2) activations and scaled mean poolings to replace
ReLUs and max poolings, respectively. As Figure 1(a)
shows, the square activation reduces the inference accuracy
by 0.82% compared to unencrypted models on MNIST. Al-
though increasing the degree of polynomials can improves
their inference accuracy, the computing overhead of acti-
vation layers also exponentially increases as shown in Fig-
ure 1(b). NED [3] also uses high-degree PAAs to obtain
nearly no accuracy loss, but its inference latency is much
longer than CNT. For CNT, NED and FCN, the PAA layers
occupies 65.7% ∼ 81.2% of total inference time. Integrat-
ing more convolutional, activation and pooling layers in
a network cannot improve the inference accuracy neither.
As Figure 1(c) shows, an unencrypted CNN model (CNN)
achieves higher inference accuracy with more layers, but
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the inference accuracy of the LHE-enabled FCN decreases
when having more convolutional and activation layers. This
is because the square approximation errors result in a low
distortion of the output distribution of the batch normaliza-
tion layer. Figure 1(d) illustrates such an output distribution
distortion of the 9th batch normalization layer in a 12-layer
LHE-enabled FCN.
Name Encry.Sche. ReLU MaxPool NoConv DeepNet
CNT[2] YASHE 7 7 7 7
NED[3] BGV 7 7 7 7
FCN[4] FV-RNS 7 7 7 7
DiNN[1] TFHE 7 7 3 7
TAPAS[5] TFHE 7 7 3 7
SHE TFHE 3 3 3 3
Table 1. The comparison of LHECNNs.
Comparison against prior works. Table 1 compares
our SHE against prior LHECNNs including CryptoNet
(CNT) [2], NED [3], Faster CryptoNet (FCN) [4], DiNN [1]
and TAPAS [5]. Due to the limitation of non-TFHE schemes,
CNT, NED and FCN cannot support ReLU and max pool-
ings. They are also slowed down by expensive homomorphic
multiplications. Although DiNN [1] and TAPAS [5] bina-
rize weights, inputs and activations to avoid homomorphic
multiplications, their accuracy is low.
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Figure 2. A 3-bit ReLU unit (X: input; R: output) and a 3-bit max
pooling unit (X and Y : inputs; Z: output).
3. SHE
3.1. ReLU Activation and Max Pooling
The rectifier (ReLU(x) = max(x, 0)) is one of the most
widely adopted activation functions, while the max pool-
ing is a sample-based discretization process heavily used
in state-of-the-art CNN models. Prior BF/V- and FV-RNS-
based LHECNNs [2, 4] approximate both ReLU(x) and
max pooling by linear polynomials leading to significant
inference accuracy degradation and substantial computing
overhead. Existing TFHE-based CNN models [1, 5] use the
1-bit sign() function to implement binarized activations that
also introduce substantial accuracy loss.
In this paper, we propose an accurate homomorphic
ReLU function and a homomorphic max pooling opera-
tion. TFHE can implement any 2-input binary homomorphic
operation, e.g., AND, OR, NOT, and MUX, over encrypted
binary data by a deterministic automaton, a Boolean gate or
a look-up table [19, 16]. In this way, as Figure 2 exhibits,
we can connect the TFHE homomorphic Boolean gates to
construct a ReLU unit and a max pooling unit. A > 2-input
TFHE gate can be divided into multiple 2-input TFHE gates.
3.2. Logarithmic Quantization
When we implemented the Faster CryptoNet (FCN)
through TFHE Boolean gates, as Figure 1(a) shows, we
observe that the TFHE-based model (TFC) although has the
same network architecture as FCN, its inference latency is
much longer. This is because TFHE is not designed and
optimized for matrix multiplications or other repetitive tasks.
So the convolutional and fully-connected layers of TFC have
become the new performance bottleneck.
To reduce the matrix multiplication computing overhead,
we logarithmically quantize the floating-point weights into
their power-of-2 representations [24, 25], so that we can re-
place all multiplications in our CNN inference by shifts and
accumulations. Prior works [26, 24, 25] suggest the loga-
rithmic quantization even with weight pruning still achieves
the same inference accuracy as full-precision models. In a
logarithmically quantized CNN model weightT ∗ input is
approximately equivalent to
∑n
i=1 inputi × 2wegihtQi, and
converted to
∑n
i=1 binaryshift(inputi, weightQi), where
weightQi = Quantize(log2(weighti)), Quantize(x)
quantizes x to the closest integer and binaryshift(a, b)
shifts a by b bits in fixed-point arithmetic 1.
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Figure 3. Logarithmic quantization in various HE cryptosystems.
As Figure 3(a) highlights, the homomorphic arithmetic
shift operation of TFHE is cheap. TFHE encrypts the plain-
text bit by bit. Moreover, it keeps the order of the ciphertext
the same as that of the plaintext. A TFHE homomorphic
arithmetic shift just copies the encrypted sign bit and the en-
crypted data to the shifted positions, so it only costs∼ 100ns
on a core of our CPU baseline. On the contrary, in other HE
schemes, e.g., B/FV [20], FV-RNS [21] and HEAAN [22],
a homomorphic arithmetic shift is equivalent to a homo-
morphic multiplication, as they encrypt each floating point
number of plaintext as a whole shown in Figure 3(b). So
1The source code for ReLU, Max Pooling and Shift-Accumulation
operations on encrypted data is attached to the supplementary material.
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Architectures Required Depth (K) Total Acc(%)
FCN C-B-A-P-C-P-F-B-A-F 1.4-0.3-3-2.4-1.4-2.4-3.1-0.3-4.6-2 21K 98.71
TCN C-B-A-P-C-P-F-B-A-F 1.4-0.3-0.1-0.2-0.2-0.2-3.1-0.3-0.1-2 9.0K 99.54
SHE C-B-A-P-C-P-F-B-A-F 0.2-0.3-0.1-0.2-0.2-0.2-0.4-0.3-0.1-0.3 2.0K 99.54
DSHE [C-B-A-C-B-A-P]x4-F-F [0.2-0.3-0.1-0.2-0.3-0.1-0.1]x4-0.7-0.5 6.8K 99.77
Table 2. The required MD of prior LHECNNs. In the column of
network architecture, C means a convolution layer; B is a batch
normalization layer; A indicates a activation layer; P denotes a
pooling layer; and F is a fully-connected layer. Acc represents the
inference accuracy. The detailed DSHE architecture can be viewed
in [8].
compared to TFHE, the homomorphic arithmetic shift in
other HE schemes are much more expensive.
3.3. Mixed Bitwidth Accumulator
Besides homomorphic shifts, the logarithmically quan-
tized CNN models require accumulations to perform infer-
ences. The computational cost of a TFHE adder are propor-
tional to its bitwidth. For instance, an 8-bit TFHE adder costs
doubled computational cost compared to its 4-bit counterpart.
We quantized the inputs, activations and weights into their
5-bit power-of-2 representations, since recent works [24, 25]
show that a 5-bit AlexNet model degrades the inference ac-
curacy by < 0.6%. However, the accumulation intermediate
results have to be represented by 16 bits. Otherwise, the
inference accuracy may dramatically decrease. Accumulat-
ing 5-bit shifted results through 16-bit TFHE adders wastes
substantial computational cost.
Therefore, we propose a mixed bitwidth accumulator
shown in Figure 3(c) to avoid the unnecessary computational
cost. A mixed bitwidth accumulator is a adder tree, where
each node is an TFHE adder. And TFHE adders at different
levels of the tree have distinctive bitwidths. At the bottom
level (layer0) of the tree, we use b-bit TFHE adders, where
b is 5. Instead of 16-bits adders, layer1 of the tree has
(b+ 1)-bit TFHE adders, since the sum of two 5-bit integers
can have at most 6 bits. The n level of our mixed bitwidth
accumulator consists of (b+ n)-bit TFHE adders.
3.4. Deeper Neural Network
The LHE mode of a HE scheme with a set of predefined
parameters allows only a fixed multiplicative depth (MD),
which is the maximal number of consecutively executed
homomorphic AND gates in a LHE Boolean circuit [27].
We use DB to indicate the total MD budget of a LHE. The
total MD required by an n-layer LHECNN is the sum of the
MD (LDi) of each layer, which is denoted by
∑n
i=0 LDi.
And LDi can be defined as
LDi = IN ·log2(KC2)·(DA[a]+DM [b])+DR[c]+log2(KP 2)·DM [d]
(1)
where IN is the input channel #; KC means the weight ker-
nel size;DA[a] is the MD required by an a-bit adder;DM [b]
indicates the MD required by a b-bit multiplier; DR[c] is
the MD required by a c-bit ReLU unit; KP denotes the
pooling kernel size; DM [d] is the MD required by a d-bit
max pooling unit. The LHECNN model must guarantee
DB ≥ ∑ni=0 LDi. Although it is possible to enlarge DB
by re-designing another set of LHE parameters, the new set
of LHE parameters increases the ciphertext size and prolongs
the overall inference latency of the LHECNN. Considering
the inference latency of prior LHECNNs is already hundreds
of seconds, enlarging DB is not a promising way to achieve
a deep network architecture. In fact, prior LHECNNs have
huge MD in each layer, since they perform matrix multipli-
cations and square activations, i.e., DM [b] and DR[c], are
large. As Table 2 shows, in a FCN testing MNIST, each
convolutional or fully-connected layer requires a 1K ∼ 2K
MD. In contrast, the activation or pool layer needs a 2 ∼ 5K
MD. As a result, they can support only shallow CNN mod-
els with less layers. The total MD of the MNIST FCN is
21K. Moreover, FCN has to reduce the number of activa-
tion layers using larger weight kernel sizes and adding more
fully-connected layers. These limitations of FCN result in
only 98.71% accuracy on MNIST.
To obtain a deep network with more layers under a fixed
DB, we need to reduce the MD (LDi) required by each
layer. After we created TCN by using our ReLU units,
Max Pooling Units and the TFHE scheme to implement the
network architecture of FCN testing MNIST, the total MD of
TCN is reduced to 9.0K in Table 2, since the required MD by
each activation or pooling layer is greatly reduced by TFHE.
When we further applied our power-of-2 quantization and
mixed bitwidth accumulators, the total MD of SHE decreases
to only 2032. This is because the TFHE shifter has 0 required
MD while our mixed bitwidth accumulator also reduces
its MD along its carry path. We further propose a deeper
SHE (DSHE) architecture by adding more convolutional
and activation layers. Compared to the 10-layer FCN, our
30-layer DSHE increases the MNIST inference accuracy to
99.77% with a required MD of 6.8K.
4. Experimental Methodology
TFHE setting and security analysis. Our schemes are
implemented with the TFHE library [28]. We used all 3
levels of TFHE in the LHE mode. The level-0 TLWE has
the minimal noise standard variation α = 6.10 · 10−5, the
count of coefficients n = 500, and the security degree
λ = 194 [19]. The level-1 TRLWE configures the mini-
mal noise standard variation α = 3.29 · 10−10, the count of
coefficients n = 1024, and the security degree λ = 152. The
level-3 TRGSW sets the minimal noise standard variation
α = 1.42 · 10−10, the count of coefficients n = 2048, the se-
curity degree λ = 289. We adopted the same key-switching
parameters as [19]. Therefore, SHE allows 32K depth of
homomorphic AND primitive in the LHE mode [19]. The
security degree of SHE is λ = 152.
4
Simulation, benchmark and dataset. We ran all experi-
ments on an Intel Xeon E7-4850 CPU with 1TB DRAM. Our
datasets include MNIST [6], CIFAR-10 [7], ImageNet [9]
and the diabetic retinopathy dataset [4] (denoted by medi-
care). Medicare comprises retinal fundus images labeled by
the condition severity including ‘none’, ‘mild’, ‘moderate’,
‘severe’, or ‘proliferative’. By following [4], we scaled the
image of medicare to the same size of ImageNet, 224×224.
We also adopted the Penn Treebank dataset [29] to evaluate
a LTFHE-enabled LSTM network.
Network architecture. The network architectures we
estimated for various datasets are summarized in Table 3.
For MNIST, we set SHE the same as CNT [2] and DSHE the
same as [33]. For CIFAR-10, we adopted the architecture of
SHE from [8] and that of DSHE from [30]. To evaluate Penn
Treebank, we used the LSTM architecture from [29], where
the activations of all LSTM gates are converted to ReLU .
Compared to the original LSTM with various activation
functions, e.g., ReLU , sigmoid and tanh, the LSTM with
all ReLU has only < 1% accuracy degradation [29]. For
ImageNet and Medical datasets, we adopted AlexNet [31],
ResNet-18 [30] and ShuffleNet [32]. For all networks, we
quantized weights into 5-bit power-of-2 representations, and
converted inputs and activations to 5-bits fixed point numbers
with little accuracy loss [24].
5. Results and Analysis
We report the inference latency and accuracy of encrypted
neural networks through the numbers of homomorphic oper-
ations (HOPs), homomorphic gate operations (HGOPs) in
Table 4∼ 7. HOPs and HGOPs are independent of the hard-
ware setting and software parallelization. Specifically, the
HOP includes additions, multiplications, shifts and compar-
isons between ciphertext and plaintext. The multiplication
between two ciphertexts (CCmult) is the most computa-
tionally expensive operation among all HOPs, since it re-
quires the largest number of homomorphic gate operations
(HGOPs). We compared SHE against four the state-of-the-
art LHECNN schemes including CNT [2], NED [3], FCN [4]
and DiNN [1]. More details can be viewed in Table 1.
5.1. MNIST
As Table 4 shows, CNT obtains 98.95% accuracy by
degree-2 polynomial approximation activations. The poly-
nomial approximation errors prevent CNT from approach-
ing the unencrypted state-of-the-art inference accuracy on
MNIST. FCN slightly degrades the inference accuracy by
0.24% but shortens the inference latency by 84.3% by quan-
tizing CNT and pruning its redundant weights. The weight
pruning of FCN significantly decreases the numbers of
CCAdd and PCMult. In contrast, FCN keeps the same num-
ber of activations, so it has the same number of CCMult
occurring during only activations. DiNN uses the TFHE
cryptosystem and quantizes all network parameters (i.e.,
weights, inputs, and activations) to 1-bit, so it reduces the
inference accuracy by 5.29%. Through increasing the degree
of polynomial approximation activations, NED improves
the inference accuracy by 0.58% over CNT. However, com-
pared to CNT, it prolongs the inference latency by 28.2%,
because it has much more CCAdds, PCMults and CCMults
to compute during an inference.
We used the TFHE cryptosystem to implement the net-
work architecture of FCN (denoted by TCN) by using
LTFHE-based ReLU activations, max poolings and matrix
multiplications. Due to the ReLU activations and max pool-
ings, TCN enhances the inference accuracy by 0.6% over
FCN. But compared to FCN, it slows down the inference by
126.6%, since TFHE is not suitable to implement massive
repetitive matrix multiplications. To create the SHE scheme,
we further use power-of-2 quantized weights and replace
matrix multiplications by LTFHE-based shift-accumulation
operations in TCN. As a result, SHE maintains the same in-
ference accuracy but greatly reduces the inference latency to
9.3s. We noticed that SHE requires only 2.0K multiplicative
depth which is much smaller than our LTFHE noise budget,
so we can use a deeper network architecture (DSHE) with
more convolutional and activation layers. DSHE obtains
99.77% accuracy and spends 124.9s in an inference. We also
reported the inference latency values of fully-TFHE-based
TCN, SHE and DSHE. Compared to leveled-TFHE-based
counterparts, they require much more time because of the
computational expensive bootstrapping operations.
The size of encrypted message that a client sends to the
cloud can be calculated by Msize = PN × SN × PS,
where PN is the pixel number of the input image; SN
means the polynomial number in a ciphertext; and PS in-
dicates the size of a polynomial. PN is dependent on the
dataset, while SN and PS are related to the cryptosystem
parameters. For a MNIST image, PN = 28 × 28 = 784.
We quantized the inputs to 5-bit, so SHE encrypts each pixel
in a MNIST image by 5 polynomials (SN = 5). In LTFHE,
PS = 32KB. Totally, an MNIST image is encrypted into
784 × 5 × 32KB = 122.5MB. Compared to other non-
TFHE cryptosystems, SHE transfers much smaller message
data between the client and the server. And typically, the
encryption and decryption latency is proportional to the en-
crypted message size [4].
5.2. CIFAR-10
Only NED and FCN can support CIFAR-10, due to its
large computational overhead. As Table 5 shows, compared
to NED with high degree polynomial approximation acti-
vations, FCN reduces the inference accuracy by 16.2% but
shortens the inference latency by 69.1%. With the same
network architecture, TCN reduces the activation compu-
tational overhead of FCN, but it requires longer convolu-
5
Dataset Network Architecture
MNIST SHE: C-B-A-P-C-P-F-B-A-F [2]; DSHE: [C-B-A-C-B-A-P]X4-F-F [8]
CIFAR-10 SHE:[C-B-A-C-B-A-P]×3-F-F [8]; DSHE: ResNet-18 [30]
Penn Treebank LSTM: time-step 25, 1 300-unit layer; ReLU ; [29]
ImageNet & Medical AlexNet [31], ResNet-18 [30] and ShuffleNet [32]
Table 3. Network architecture (C means a convolution layer; A is a batch normalization layer and a activation layer; P indicates a pooling
layer; and F is a fully-connected layer.).
Scheme HOPs CCAdd PCMult CCMult PCShift CCCom HGOPs Depth MSize EDL(s) FIL(s) LIL(s) Acc(%)
CNT 612K 312K 296K 945 0 0 - 134K 368MB 47.5 - 250 98.95
FCN 67K 38K 24K 945 0 0 - 21K 411MB 6.7 - 39.1 98.71
DiNN 16K 8K 8K 40 0 0 40K 80 66MB 0.0002 - 0.49 93.71
NED 4.7M 2.3M 2.3M 1.6K 0 0 - 172K 337MB 16.7 - 320 99.52
TCN 42K 19K 19K 0 0 3K 8.3M 8.8K 123MB 0.0014 108K† 88.6 99.54
SHE 23K 19K 945 0 19K 3K 856K 2.0K 123MB 0.0014 11K† 9.3 99.54
DSHE 613K 304K 5K 0 304K 5K 11.6M 6.2K 123MB 0.0014 149K† 124.9 99.77
Table 4. The results on MNIST (HOPs: homomorphic operations; HGOPs: homomorphic gate operations; Depth: multiplicative depth;
MSize: ciphertext message size; EDL: encryption and decryption latency; Acc: inference accuracy; FIL: fully TFHE inference latency; LIL:
leveled TFHE inference latency; CCAdd: # of additions between two ciphertexts; PCMult: # of multiplications between a plaintext and a
ciphertext; CCMult: # of multiplications between two ciphertexts; PCShift: # of shifts between a plaintext and a ciphertext; CCCom: # of
comparisons (including ReLU and max pooling) between two ciphertexts. † denotes that we ran only its first 3 layers and made FIL values
by projections.).
Scheme HOPs CCAdd PCMult CCMult PCShift CCCom HGOPs Depth MSize EDL(s) FIL(s) LIL(s) Acc(%)
NED 2.4G 1.2G 1.2G 212K 0 0 0 - 1.8GB 21.8 - 127K† 91.50
FCN 610M 350M 350M 64K 0 0 0 69.8K 1.6GB 8.8 - 39K† 76.72
TCN 8.7M 4.4M 4.4M 0 0 16K 2.8G 25.1K 160MB 0.0018 37M† 31K† 92.54
SHE 4.4M 4.4M 13K 0 4.4M 16K 211M 5.2K 160MB 0.0018 2.7M† 2258 92.54
DSHE 68M 68M 98K 0 68M 131K 3.3G 13.7K 160MB 0.0018 42.5M† 12041 94.62
Table 5. The results on CIFAR-10 († denotes that we ran only its first 3 layers and made FIL and LIL values by projections. Abbreviations
are the same as Table 4).
tion latency. Overall, it reduces the inference latency by
20.5%. However, the ReLU activations and max poolings
increase the inference accuracy to 92.54%. Compared to
TCN, SHE reduces the number of PCMult by 99.7%. As a
result, it improves the inference latency by 92.7% over TCN
by performing only LTFHE shift-accumulation operations.
Because SHE requires only 5.2K multiplicative depth which
is much smaller than our LTFHE noise budget 32K, we use
a deeper network, DSHE, to increase the inference accuracy
to 96.62% and the inference latency to 12041s.
5.3. ImageNet and Medical Datasets
No prior LHECNN model supports the entire inference
on an ImageNet picture, because of its prohibitive compu-
tational overhead. FCN [4] can compute inferences for the
last 3 layers of a network testing ImageNet. In Table 6, SHE
uses the network architectures of AlexNet, ResNet-18 and
ShuffleNet for inferences on ImageNet. For AlexNet and
ResNet-18, TCNs ask for >32K multiplicative depth which
is larger than our LTFHE noise budget. Therefore, TCN
cannot work on them. On the contrary, SHE needs 1 day and
2.5 days to test an ImageNet picture by AlexNet and ResNet-
18, respectively. Particularly, SHE requires only 5 hours to
test an ImageNet image and achieves 69.4% top-1 accuracy
by the ShuffleNet topology. For the medical dataset, it ob-
tains 71.32% inference accuracy. Besides shorter latency
and higher accuracy, SHE enables a much deeper architec-
ture under a fixed LTFHE noise budget, since the LTFHE
shifts increase little multiplicative depth. SHE is the critical
enabler to construct accurate and deep LHECNN models,
e.g., AlexNet, ResNet-18 and Shufflenet.
5.4. Penn Treebank
No prior LHECNN model supports LSTM, since it asks
for huge multiplicative depth. As Figure 4(a) shows, the
required multiplicative depth of the matrix multiplication
in all time steps between Ht−1 and Xt is 4.7K (caculated
by Equation 1) × 25 = 117.5K which is already larger than
current 32K LTFHE noise budget. Therefore, TCN cannot
successfully implement the LSTM architecture. We use SHE
to build a LSTM network to predict the next word on Penn
Treebank as Figure 4(b) shows where SHE using shifts and
accumulations with small multiplicative depth to replace
expensive matrix multiplications, only costs 0.5K multiplica-
tive depth in the multiplications between between Ht−1 and
Xt. SHE costs total 30K depth which is below the threshold
of 32K LTFHE noise budget like the Table 7 shows. The
accuracy of LSTM on Penn Treebank is measured by Per-
plexity Per Word (PPW). SHE obtains 89.8 PPW. Compared
to the full-precision LSTM on plaintext data, it degrades the
6
Network Scheme HOPs CCAdd PCMult PCShift CCCom HGOPs Depth MSize EDL(s) FIL(s) LIL(s) AccI (%) AccM (%)
AlexNet TCN 0.3G 0.14G 0.14G 0 0.66M 38G 42.3K 7.7GB 0.07 - - - -SHE 0.14G 0.14G 0.4M 0.14G 0.34M 5.5G 6.8K 7.7GB 0.07 72M† 89K† 54.17 63.24
ResNet TCN 0.7G 0.36G 0.36G 0 2.47M 100G 96.4K 7.7GB 0.07 - - - -SHE 0.36G 0.36G 1.1M 0.36G 0.49M 15G 13.7K 7.7GB 0.07 195M† 0.23M† 66.8 67.29
Shuffle TCN 56M 0.14G 0.14G 0 1.37M 7.9G 27.1K 7.7GB 0.07 102M† 126K† 69.4 71.32SHE 28M 28M 83K 28M 275K 1.1G 3.9K 7.7GB 0.07 14M† 18K 69.4 71.32
Table 6. The results on ImageNet and Medical dataset (AccI means the inference accuracy of ImageNet, while AccM denotes the inference
accuracy of the medical dataset. The other abbreviations are the same as Table 4. † denotes that we ran only its first 3 layers and made FIL
and LIL values by projections.).
Scheme HOPs CCAdd PCMult PCShift CCCom HGOPs Depth MSize EDL(s) FIL(s) LIL(s) PPW
TCN 576K 270K 270K 0 36K 75.7M 143K 9.4MB 0.014 - - -
SHE 336K 270K 30.4K 243K 36K 24.4M 30K 9.4MB 0.014 318K† 576 89.8
Table 7. The results on Penn Treebank (Abbreviations are the same as Table 4. † denotes that we ran only its first 3 layers and made FIL
values by projections.).
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Figure 4. Required multiplicative depth breakdown of FCN and SHE implementations on ReLU-based LSTM where we use TFHE-friendly
ReLU to replace sigmoid and tanh activations inspired by [29]. 25 timesteps of LSTM share the same function and computational process
which takes previous layer’s output Ht−1 and current input word Xt in Penn Treebank as inputs and generates output Ht.
inference accuracy by only 2.1%. It takes 576s for SHE to
conduct an inference on the dataset of Penn Treebank.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose SHE to overcome the polyno-
mial approximation activations and poolings by using TFHE
and logarithmic quantization. We present a ReLU unit, a
max pooling unit and a mixed bitwidth accumulator to accel-
erate SHE inference and reduce its required multiplicative
depth. Our experimental results show SHE achieves the
state-of-the-art inference accuracy and reduces the inference
latency by 76.21% ∼ 94.23% over prior LHECNNs on vari-
ous datasets. SHE is the first LHE-enabled model that can
support deep CNN architectures on ImageNet and LSTM
architectures on Penn Treebank.
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